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NOTES
APPLICATION OF LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCES
TO STATE-CONTROLLED PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND LICENSEES: A STUDY IN PREEMPTION
The area of state-local conflicts is one in which very few principles
have evolved that are capable of concrete application to specific cases.
Indeed, the question may be raised whether the courts have even
begun to develop the relevant criteria that must be used in deciding
these conflicts.'
This note discusses the conflicts that arise when municipalities seek to
enforce zoning regulations against state-controlled liquor licensees2 and
public utilities.3 Two hypothetical examples illustrate how these conflicts
can occur. Assume that a state liquor control board issues a license to op-
erate a liquor store in a residential section of a municipality which has a
zoning prohibition against liquor stores at that location. Since the state
statute and local ordinance both apply to the state licensee, the question
arises whether the municipality, through its zoning ordinance, can prohibit
the licensee from operating his business at the intended location. A court
considering this question encounters the issue of preemption because both
the state statute and the local ordinance have taken locational factors into
account. On what basis should the court decide? The preemption ques-
tion arises in similar fashion in the utility area. A state public utility com-
mission may authorize a public utility to construct an electric generating
plant in a municipality whose zoning ordinance prohibits such a structure
at the designated location.
Opposing locational determinations by a state licensing agency and a
municipality present a court with a clear confrontation of authority between
two creatures of the state. The question which determination is to prevail
is answered simply in those states where the statute specifically prescribes
the level whose decision is deemed preeminent. When areas of authority are
1. 1 MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 101 (1963).
2. The conflicts arising when a municipality attempts to regulate the sale and
distribution of liquor by a state licensee are similar to those which arise when a municipal-
ity attempts to regulate and control any state licensed activity or business. Therefore, it is
possible to discuss the preemption problem in the license area by structuring this note
around cases involving state liquor licensees.
3. Conflicts between municipality and public utility often occur when the utility,
stressing the importance of cost and engineering over beauty or other considerations,
seeks to locate its facilities in or near a residential development.
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not prescribed by statute, some courts traditionally have reached an equally
summary result by application of mechanical doctrines which accord prefer-
ence to the state agency. A more sophisticated approach which considers
the policy issues supporting each decision has been developed elsewhere.
This note examines the traditional doctrines and contrasts them with the
more sophisticated approach which takes direct account of the interests that
both governmental levels serve.4
I. SOME PRELIMINARY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A court that is unwilling to find state preemption whenever there is a
conflict with a local zoning ordinance may decide to look behind the ap-
pearance of conflict to determine if it represents an actual conflict of pur-
pose between the two regulations. Because each governmental unit may
apply different criteria to pursue different goals within its enabling au-
thority, it is only in this fashion that a court can fully ascertain actual con-
flict. Actual conflict is defined as opposing locational determinations based
on similar criteria, i.e., the purpose for each decision is the same in that
both the state agency and the municipality consider similar factors in
reaching their determinations. Two difficulties inhere in this approach;
both are formidable. First, a court must be able to establish the criteria on
which each determination is purportedly based. Even more difficult, it must
next distinguish those criteria that have a significant influence from those not
seriously considered. Of course, a court could reject the determination of
either the state agency or the municipality if that unit erroneously applied
the evidence in considering its decision. For example, if the conflicting de-
terminations were based on considerations of competition, a court could
reject that part of the state agency's determination based on these factors
if the evidence supported the competition conclusion reached by the muni-
cipality.
If a court concludes that the criteria actually utilized by each unit are
similar, straight preemption occurs; the state agency's decision prevails.
The basis for this result is the traditional doctrine that the state agency,
operating for the entire state, functions as a higher government authority.
However, if the court concludes that the local zoning ordinance covers
4. Since location and amenity conflicts raise functional problems, this note develops
the thesis that these conflicts should be decided functionally, i.e., by considering and
weighing the competing state and municipal interests. This approach is the one most likely
to achieve a suitable solution and it eliminates the unsatisfactory and unnecessary applica-
tion of traditional doctrines in those cases in which the legislature, without making an
attempt at reconciliation, has conferred overlapping powers to the municipal and state
authorities.
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factors not considered in the state agency's decision, the court may attempt
to accommodate both the state and the local purpose and refuse to find pre-
emption. For example, the state decision might be limited to a review
of the licensee's character, while the zoning determination might be de-
signed to restrict the intended site to land uses compatible with the sur-
rounding neighborhood. It is possible that the court could accommodate
both goals by upholding the applicability of the zoning ordinance while
permitting the licensee to locate his business in another part of the munici-
pality, which result would simultaneously satisfy the state agency's goal of
satisfactory character and the municipality's efforts to preserve compati-
bility of land use. However, it is more likely that a court disposed towards
investigating the basis of the conflicting decisions is attempting to pursue a
balancing approach to select one of the decisions.
The reason a court would inquire into the purpose attempted to be
served by each determination is to permit it to favor the determination that
is based on the criteria it deems should control the location of the licensee.
At this point, a court is distinctly in a policy making posture. For example,
if a court held that compatibility factors should control the locational de-
termination, it would uphold a zoning ordinance that had been enacted
to accomplish this purpose over a state agency's decision based solely on
competitive considerations. However, this example belies the more likely
situation; balancing will almost always be a more intricate process than
deciding in favor of a single factor that is isolated in only one of the regu-
lations. Decisions at both levels reflect considerations of numerous factors.
A court is unlikely to be persuaded that a single one should control. More-
over, it is possible that a court will conclude that several factors are relevant
to the locational determination in a case in which one determination rests
on one or more of these factors while the opposing determination is based
on the remaining ones. The balancing process, therefore, will usually re-
quire a court to decide for the unit that, in its locational determination,
attempted to achieve those purposes the court judges to preponderate, both
in number and in importance.
It would be naive to assert that any court employing a balancing process
would operate wholly independently of the influence of traditional doc-
trines. Whatever system of measure courts may employ to compare op-
posing determinations, most courts will continue to place into the balancing
equation the traditional favor for the decisions of state agencies. Addition-
ally, zoning ordinances that cause harsh results will incline courts to disfavor
enforcing local action. Such factors as the expense or difficulty of adapting
the intended location of the licensed business to a land use compatible
with the zoning restriction and the unavailability to the licensee of a suit-
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able alternative, must be recognized as persuasive to a court considering
an argument (which will usually be advanced by counsel for the state
agency) which espouses traditional doctrines of preemption.
Comparison of Licensee and Utility Cases
In weighing the opposing state and local determinations in the liquor
licensee and utility cases, the court will be faced with issues that are basi-
cally the same though cast in a different guise. In the liquor license cases
the issue is the power of the municipality to restrict the number and loca-
tion of a local business in the community interest. Either the zoning ordi-
nance seeks to exclude the licensee from the municipality entirely, or it seeks
to exclude the licensee from a section of the municipality.' But it is im-
material to the licensee which of these exclusions occurs because his license
is confined to one location and either restricts entirely the operation of his
business. Thus the zoning determination has a direct impact on the state
licensee.
In the case of the utility (a state-wide or area-wide business), the appli-
cation of the local ordinance will most likely lead to total exclusion, but
sometimes there may be an alternative location within the muncipality. In
addition, an amenity issue may arise which involves the character of the
proposed facilities rather than their location.6 Consequently, the issue is
whether local considerations of amenity or compatibility of land use over-
ride the considerations of efficiency and economy which led the state utility
commission to authorize the facilities and their specific location. Further-
more, the impact of the zoning determination is less direct in the utility
case because the utlity is a monopoly and must operate somewhere; the issue
is cost and efficiency, not (as in the liquor license cases) the right to do
business.
If the liquor licensee cannot relocate, and identical or similar criteria-
e.g., competitive and compatibility factors-form the basis of the state and
local decisions, it will be more difficult for the local ordinance to prevail in
the license cases than in the utility cases for two reasons: in the utility cases,
(1) the opposing determinations are always based on different criteria, and
(2) the zoning ordinance can never have a completely restrictive effect.
This note discusses (1) the cases in which the conventional doctrines
5. To some extent the character of the exclusion will depend more on the size and
character of the municipality than on the formal nature of the zoning ordinance. In a
small municipality, to exclude the licensee from "residential" zones may mean total
exclusion if the commercial zone is small or does not permit a liquor outlet.
6. For example, instead of overhead electric lines the municipality may require
underground cables.
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have been applied; (2) the policy considerations which should underlie the
resolution of the preemption issue; (3) some statutory solutions to the
problem of state-local conflicts; and (4) the regulatory statutes governing
public utilities and liquor licenses. Basically, these regulatory statutes fall
into three categories. First, constitutional or statutory language may spe-
cifically provide that the state shall have exclusive control over a particular
business or activity.' This "occupation of the field"' is the clearest example
of state preemption of municipal regulation in an area. Second, the legis-
lature may, without reconciling the state and local powers, confer power
on both the municipality and state to regulate that particular business or
activity.' Although this specific authorization precludes state "occupation
of the field," the local ordinance will be preempted by state legislation if
the two are in conflict."° Third, the state may pass legislation in the field
without an express indication whether municipalities may also legislate in
7. With respect to the sale of alcoholic beverages see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22
(Supp. 1963): "The State of California... shall have the exclusive right and power to
license and regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession, and transportation of
alcoholic beverages within the state." MICH. CONST. art. XVI, § 11: "The legislature
may by law establish a liquor control commission, who, subject to statutory limitations
shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state .... "
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-1-6(b) (1953): The liquor control commission shall "Decide,
within the limits and under the conditions imposed by this act, the number and location
of the stores and package agencies to be established in the state." VA. CODE ANN. §
4-96 (1950):
No county, city or town shall, except as otherwise provided.. ., pass or adopt any
ordinance or resolution regulating or prohibiting the manufacture, bottling,
possession, sale, distribution, handling, transportation, drinking, use, advertizing
or dispensing of alcoholic beverages in Virginia. And all local acts, including
charter provisions and ordinances of cities and towns, inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this chapter, are hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.
Contrariwise, a municipality may be granted the power to license as well as the exclusive
power to control the location of licensees. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 58-1028 (Supp.
1963) (licensing statute): "All muncipal and county authorities ... shall within their
respective jurdisdiction have authority to determine the location of any distillery, whole-
sale business, or retail business licensed by them."
8. The "occupation of the field" concept is discussed in 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW § 5.22 (1965).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-147 (1943) provides that cities and villages may "regulate
by ordinance," not inconsistent with the provision of the liquor control act, the business
of state beer licensees.
10. 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 5.20. The legislature, however, can provide
that even where there is conflict the local provision shall be controlling. For example,
in Paul v. State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 25, 106 S.W. 448 (1907) the court upheld a
provision in the city's charter which stated "that the provisions of this act in so far as
they may conflict with any state law shall be held to supersede the state law to that extent
and it shall not be held invalid on account of such conflict."
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the same field." The second and third types of legislation, especially the
latter, present the greatest problems.
II. OUTCOME INFLUENCED BY THE CONTENT OF THE STATUTE
Since a court, in determining whether there is state preemption, is con-
cerned with the applicability, not the reasonableness of the ordinance,
even a reasonable exercise of the municipality's zoning power must give way
when it conflicts with the power of the state or any of its agencies, unless
the statute involved contains an express12 grant of power to cities to regulate
or restrict the location of state-controlled businesses or a grant of power
which can be interpreted to confer this power. Thus, when the liquor,
utility, or zoning statute grants exclusive power to control the location of
liquor licensees and public utilities to either the state or municipality, the
problems discussed in this note are eliminated. Further, by defining the
areas of state and local authority, such a statute greatly reduces the possi-
bility of state-local conflicts. Even if a conflict occurs the preemption ques-
tion can be easily decided without resort to vague, mechanical standards
such as "legislative intent" and state "occupation of the field."
This exclusive power to prescribe the location of a state liquor licensee
has been conferred on municipalities in various forms. For example, the
licensing statute may (1) grant a municipality the power to "regulate and
control" the sale of alcoholic beverages;" s (2) provide either that a state
11. See, e.g., the statute discussed in Square Deal Coal Haulers & Yardmen's Club,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 83, 176 N.E.2d 348 (Cuyahoga County C.P.
1961).
12. Cooke v. Loper, 151 Ala. 546, 44 So. 78 (1907); National Amusement Co. v.
Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N.W. 342 (1935); Brackman's, Inc. v. City of Huntington,
126 W. Va. 21, 27 S.E.2d 71 (1943).
13. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 311.220(2) (1959): The proper municipal authorities "may
make and enforce ordinances for the regulation and control of the sale of all intoxicating
liquors within their limits . . . where not inconsistent with the provisions of this law."
NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-147 (1943): "The governing bodies of cities and villages are
hereby authorized to regulate by ordinance, not inconsistent with provisions of this act,
the business of all beer licenses carried on within their corporate limits." NE.. REv.
STAT. § 53-116 (1943): "The power to regulate all phases of the control of the manu-
facture, distribution, sale and traffic in alcoholic liquors, except as specifically delegated
in this act, is hereby vested exclusively in the (state) commission." In Phelps, Inc. v. City
of Hastings, 152 Neb. 651, 42 N.W.2d 300 (1950) the court held an ordinance prescrib-
ing the location of a state licensee's place of business not inconsistent with section 53-147
of the licensing statute. The power to "regulate" has traditionally been held to include
the power to locate.
Pursuant to these provisions a municipality may pass a general police power ordinance
limiting the number (State ex rel. Hewlett v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809
(1946) (en bane)) and location (Phelps, Inc. v. City of Hastings, supra; see State
ex rel. Floyd v. Noel, 124 Fla. 852, 169 So. 549 (1936)) of retail liquor outlets within
its borders.
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license shall not issue to an applicant who intends to operate his business
within a city "zone" where the sale of beer or liquor is prohibited by ordi-
nance, or that a city can establish "zones" within which the business of a
state licensee cannot be located;1" or (3) provide that a state license shall
not issue in contravention of a "proper" or "valid""5 zoning ordinance or
an ordinance adopted pursuant to the zoning laws of the state."e In a few
14. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 48-517 (Supp. 1963) (licensing statute): "All incorporated
cities and towns... may impose additional restrictions, fixing zones and territories and
providing... such other rules and regulations as will promote public health, morals and
safety....." KAN. LAWS 1963, ch. 268: "[T]he governing body of any city ... may
establish zones within which no place of business [of a state licensee] may be located not
inconsistent with the provisions of this act." MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 4-403 (1) (a)
(Supp. 1965) (licensing statute): "[N]o retail license may be issued by the board for
any premises situated within any zone of a city or town wherein the sale of liquor is
prohibited by ordinance, a certified copy of which has been filed with the board."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-208 (1955) (Beer & Light Alcoholic Beverages Act): "[Cqities
and towns [may fix] ... zones and territories... and such other rules and regulations as
will promote public health, morals and safety ... ." TEx. PEN. CODE art. 667-10'A
(Supp. 1964) provides that cities may establish zones within residential areas in which
the sale of beer may be prohibited.
Under these provisions a general police power ordinance which permits the sale of
intoxicants only on designated streets is reasonable, Madison v. City of Maryville, 173
Tenn. 489, 121 S.W.2d 540 (1938), and a state licensee can be prohibited from operating
his business in premises located on any street on which such sales are not permitted. Also,
a city may, by a zoning ordinance, restrict the areas within the city where alcoholic
beverages may be sold. Louder v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 214 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1948).
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790: "No retail license shall be issued for any
premises which are located in any territory where the exercise of the rights and privileges
conferred by the license is contrary to a valid zoning ordinance of any county or
city ...."
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 30-44 (1961): "The commission shall refuse permits
for the sale of alcoholic liquor (1) in no-permit towns, [and] (2) where prohibited by
the zoning ordinance of any city or town . . . ." This statute clearly indicates that a
state license issued contrary to the provisions of a zoning ordinance is void. Town of
Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 48 A.2d 729 (1946). However an ordinance
which provides that there can be one retail outlet for every fifteen hundred residents is
not a zoning ordinance and hence cannot preclude a state licensee from conducting his
business. State ex rel. Haverback v. Thomson, 134 Conn. 288, 57 A.2d 259 (1948). The
court indicated that although a city may establish zones, the legislature had not "dele-
gated to municipalities authority to limit, in the guise of a zoning ordinance, the number
of liquor outlets in the town .... " Id. at 293, 57 A.2d at 261. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.44
(1961): "Incorporated cities and towns are hereby given the power hereafter to estab-
lish zoning ordinances restricting the location wherein a [state liquor licensee] ... may be
permitted to conduct his place of business and no license shall be granted to any such
licensee to conduct a place of business in a location where such place of business is pro-
hibited from being operated by such municipal ordinance. . . ." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
26:280 A. (1950): "No permit shall be granted ... in contravention of any municipal
ordinance adopted pursuant to the zoning laws of this state." MNI. CODE ANN. art. 2B, §
43 (1957): "No license or permit ... shall be issued in violation of any zoning rule or
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states there are similar statutory provisions granting municipalities the
power to regulate state-licensed trailer-camps.Y
regulation.. . ." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.13(3) (Supp. 1964): "No license shall be is-
sued for premises located within the areas restricted against commercial use through zon-
ing ordinances ... and no license shall be issued contrary to the provision of any charter,
ordinance, or any special lav restricting areas within which intoxicating liquors may be
sold ... ." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 534(c) (Supp. 1964): "The location of a re-
tail package store shall be subject to the nondiscriminatory zoning ordinances of the
town or city in which located .... "
This express statutory language would seem to preclude state-local conflict, but an
allegation that the ordinance is not "valid" (Jon-Mar Co. v. City of Anaheim, 201 Cal.
App. 2d 832, 20 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1962); Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 190 Cal. App. 2d
599, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1961)) raises the preemption issue in another form. In reject-
ing the contended invalidity of a zoning ordinance which allegedly singled out the sale of
liquor for special treatment thus infringing upon the regulatory power of the state licens-
ing agency, one court said:
The argument confuses the function of zoning with that of the control of the
sale of liquor. The essence of zoning lies in metropolitan and regional planning;
it is the use and treatment of public and private land and its appurtenences in the
interests of the community as a whole. The factors and reasons that determine
the imposition of metropolitan zoning are entirely different from those which control
the regulation of the consumption of liquor. To compress zoning or city planning
into the mould of liquor regulation is to reduce its compass to a single aspect of its
impact. Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, supra at 185.
In Floresta, the challenged zoning ordinance provided that an establishment selling
liquor could not be located within two hundred feet of a residential district unless a
permit was obtained for that purpose. In that case the ordinance prohibited the
petitioner from establishing a cocktail lounge in a shopping center. Excluding such an
establishment from a commercial district was held neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
See Eckert v. Jacobs, 142 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1940).
17. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2881 (Supp. 1965) provides:
No governmental body other than the state board of health shall have au-
thority to license or regulate mobile home parks except that . . . county and mu-
nicipal authorities within their respective jurisdiction[s] shall have jurisdiction re-
garding zoning and building codes and ordinances pertaining to mobile home parks.
Although there are no reported cases interpreting this provision, it would appear that a
local zoning ordinance may exclude a mobile home park licensed by the state authority.
The Illinois mobile home park act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 168 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1964), is similar in that a permit from the state health department authorizing the
construction of a mobile home park "does not relieve the applicant from securing building
permits in municipalities or counties having a building code, or from complying with
any municipal or county zoning or other ordinance applicable thereto." Moreover,
section 185 provides that "if the provisions of this Act as to location, construction, lay-
out, sanitation, operation and maintenance are met as a minimum, then this Act shall
not apply in any county, city, village or incorporated town which provides for the
licensing and regulation of trailer parks." These sections authorize both state and local
regulation of the same field. The statute was passed primarily to fill in gaps caused by
the absence of municipal regulations, but where a local regulatory ordinance has been
passed, either the statutory or municipal regulations are applicable, depending on
which imposes higher standards. Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E.
2d 706 (1963).
MrcH. STAT. ANN. § 5.278(24) (1961), pertaining to mobile homes not located in
licensed parks, provides that "nothing in this act or in the regulations or bylaws hereby
authorized shall supersede or be in conflict with local zoning . . . regulations, local
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In the public utility area, instead of granting control to either the state
or municipality, those statutes that defer to local zoning ordinances at-
tempt to accommodate the powers of the utility and zoning commissions by
requiring consideration by the state agency of all competing interests. These
statutes usually provide that if the municipal authorities refuse a building
permit to a public service corporation on the ground that the proposed
structure would violate an ordinance, the corporation may petition the
state Public Service Commission for a determination that the structure is
reasonably necessary for the welfare or convenience of the public and
hence exempt from the provisions of the local ordinance." A determination
of "reasonable necessity" may not be made, however, until both the state
and municipal interests have been considered and weighed. The commis-
sion must not only consider the effect of the structure's presence on the
municipality and persons living adjacent to its proposed location, but also
the probable effects and benefits to the entire state and the territory
ordinances or other legal restrictions for the protection of the public health and welfare."
In regard to state licensed parks section 5.278(46) provides: "Nothing in this act nor
any act of the state health commissioner shall relieve the applicant . . .from responsi-
bility for securing any building permits or complying with all applicable codes, regula-
tions or ordinances not in conflict with this act." A municipality may restrict the loca-
tion of mobile home parks by reasonable zoning ordinances, notwithstanding the issuance
of a state license. June v. City of Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104 N.W.2d 792 (1960);
Cook v. Bandeen, 356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959); Gust v. Township of Canton,
342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Stevens v. Township of Royal Oak, 342 Mich.
105, 68 N.W.2d 787 (1955).
However, the existence of a regulatory and licensing statute that does not defer to
local ordinances or power increases the possibility that trailer camp ordinances will be
invalidated because of state occupation of the field or conflicting state law. For example,
if a municipality has traditionally regulated the location of trailer parks pursuant to
power granted by the zoning enabling act authorizing the city to regulate the location
of buildings and structures used for residential purposes (Huff v. City of Des Moines, 244
Iowa 89, 56 N.W.2d 54 (1952)), and a statute is then enacted vesting power in the
state department of health to license trailer camps and "to delegate to local boards of
health the duties of inspection and regulation of mobile home parks located within the
jurisdiction of such local board of health, where, in the opinion of the state department
of health, such delegation can best effectuate the policies of this chapter" (IowA CODE
ANN. § 135D.20 (Supp 1964)), may the municipality continue to regulate the location
of trailer camps, or has the statute occupied the field and thereby preempted local zoning
and general police power ordinances? Even if the statute leaves uncovered a certain
area of activity, to what extent may the municipality legislate without fear of conflict
with state law?
18. CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-9 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. Iav. § 16-235
(1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 239, § 4953 (1964); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
40 A, § 10 (1960); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN § 31:62 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-50
(1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48309 (boroughs) & tit. 16, § 2038 (county) (1956);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3010 & tit. 30, § 221 (1959). For a discussion of several of
these statutes, see Note, 13 SYRAcusE L. REy. 581, 587 (1962).
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served by the petitioner.19 Thus a balancing process replaces considerations
of "legislative intent" in the determination of preemption. In addition,
these statutes assure municipalities that they may enact a zoning ordinance
without fear that it will be judicially invalidated on the ground that it has
invaded a field "occupied" by the state.
Under these statutes, when will permission to locate public utility facilities
contrary to local ordinance provisions be granted under such proceedings?
Following the petition,2" the commission may decide the applicability
issue in favor of either the city or the utility. To justify a decision that the
utility is not subject to a local ordinance, lack of an available alternative lo-
19. New York Cent. R.R. v. Department of Pub. Util., 199 N.E.2d 319 (Mass.
1964). This case involved an appeal by a railroad from a decision of the department of
public utilities which refused to exempt the public service corporation from a zoning by-
law on the ground that the railroad had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
"that the public generally will receive any benefit from [the proposed] .. . development."
Id. at 323. The corporation wanted to use residentially zoned land to store new auto-
mobiles unloaded from railroad cars. The court vacated the department's order and
remanded the case for failure to make adequate findings of facts on the relevant issues:
These issues include (a) the extent of the usefulness of the proposed facility to
shippers, manufacturers, motor vehicle distributors, and consumers; (b) the suita-
bility of the locus for the proposed facility and for other uses, the physical character
of the locus, the uses existing in the neighborhood, the proximity of the locus to
the railroad and to a motor assembly plant. .. , and the other uses (which include
residences, public and recreational buildings, welfare institutions, passenger sta-
tions, reservoirs, airports, radio and television towers, cemeteries, and some raising
of livestock) permitted in this general residence district by Ethel ... zoning by-law;
(c) the probable effect of the facility upon the gross and net revenues of the rail-
road; upon the railroad's ability to continue to perform its intrastate and inter-
state public functions; upon local and State tax revenues, local employment, and
the orderly development of Framingham [the zoning municipality], and upon
abutting owners; (d) the effect of the facility upon highway congestion not only
in Framingham but in reducing use of highways throughout the State for long
distance shipments of motor vehicles from factory to consumer; (e) the possibility
that injury to abutting owners can be minimized by proper screening of the fa-
cility by trees and otherwise; and (f) the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the proposal from the standpoint of the public welfare and convenience. Id. at
325 n.4.
In Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn.
243, 140 A.2d 874 (1958), it was contended that CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 16-235
(1958), which provides that the local zoning commission, subject to the review of the
public utility commission, may "regulate and restrict the [proposed] location of" utility
facilities, was unconstitutional in that it delegates legislative power to administrative
agencies (zoning and utility commissions) without any legislative standard to guide them.
In rejecting this contention the court said that there are standards and that the same
standards guide both the zoning and utility commissions, i.e., they are "guided by a
combination of the standards of public convenience and necessity and the standards of
public health, safety and welfare and the stabilization of property values." Jennings v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670, 103 A.2d 535, 546 (1954).
20. Failure to petition the utility commission for an exemption subjects the proposed
facilities to the operation of the zoning ordinance. Yahnel v. Board of Adjustment,
76 N.J. Super. 546, 185 A.2d 50 (1962).
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cation need not be shown;2" evidence supporting the conclusion that the
facility is needed,22 and that the proposed location is the most economical
and feasible one, will be adequate justification," especially when there is
little or no effect on surrounding property values.24 Nor will the fact that
the proposed location is not the best available' or that the utility has failed
to introduce evidence negating the existence of a suitable alternative, sup-
port a conclusion that the ordinance is applicable to the utility.
26
The New Jersey provision" is representative of the statutes discussed in
this section: its application in In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.2" affords a
view of the criteria by which the commissions and courts consider and re-
solve the applicability issues arising under this and similar statutes. The
utility desired to erect poles and electric transmission lines over a private
right of way which traversed the city and bordered a residential area. The
state utility commission granted immunity from the zoning ordinance on the
ground that the proposed structure was reasonably necessary for the service
and convenience of the public. On appeal the city contended that it had a
right to require the utility's use of underground cables rather than over-
21. Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145
Conn. 243, 140 A.2d 874 (1958).
22. The utility commission can make its finding that public convenience and necessity
requires the erection of the proposed facilities on the basis not only of the utility's
franchise area but on the needs of those areas that the commission may require the
utility to service. Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n v. Connecticut Light & Power
Co., supra note 21.
23. Reber v. South Lakewood Sanitation Dist., 147 Colo. 70, 362 P.2d 877 (1961);
Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra note 21.
24. Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra
note 21; In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d 233 (1961). Since
the objectionable features of using coal rather than oil would be eliminated by smoke
arresters and the proposed electric generating plant would be modem in design and
appropriately landscaped, the court in Wilson found there were sufficient reasons in the
record to support the utility commission's determination that the plant would not
constitute a nuisance or depreciate property values. The same decision was reached in
In re Public Serv. on the ground that the overhead electric transmission lines were to be
erected above railroad tracks already passing through the town.
25. New York Cent. R.R. v. Department of Pub. Util., 199 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. 1964);
Town of Wenham v. Department of Pub. Util., 333 Mass. 15, 127 N.E.2d 791 (1955).
26. New York Cent. R.R. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 84 N.J. Super. 85, 201 A.2d
67 (1964).
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-50 (1940) (zoning enabling act):
This article or any ordinance or regulation made under authority thereof, shall not
apply to existing property or to buildings or structures used or to be used by
public utilities in furnishing service, if upon a petition of the public utility, the
board of public utility commissioners shall after a hearing, of which the municipality
affected shall have notice, decide that the present or proposed situation of the
building or structure in question is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience
or welfare of the public.
28. 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d 233 (1961), noted 42 N.C.L. Rav. 761, 771 (1964).
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head lines. The court, in rendering its decision in favor of the utility, listed
and discussed the relevant factors that should be considered in the process
of balancing the state and local decisions.29
First, the statutory requirement that the structure be reasonably necessary
for the "public" refers to the entire public served by the utility, not the
local public benefited by the zoning ordinance. This factor favored the
utility because the increase in population in the area serviced by the utility
required greater generation of electric power and transmission lines with
greater voltage capacity than underground cables.
Second, the proposed use need only be reasonably, not indispensably
necessary for the public welfare at some site. Evidence of future need for
the proposed use coupled with the fact that the zoning municipality lay
between the generating station and the area whose needs for electric power
were expanding swung this factor in the utility's favor.
Third, the particular location chosen by the utility must be reasonably
necessary. The evidence showed that of the alternative sites the right of
way in question was the only feasible one.
Fourth, the advantages and disadvantages of alternative methods to the
utility, the consuming public and the zoning municipality must be com-
pared. In applying this criterion the court made the following considera-
tions: the cost of underground cables was nearly four times that of overhead
lines; the requirement that the cables be insulated would greatly diminish
their volt carrying capacity, and although a single cable would satisfy
29. In re Public Serv. is also an interesting case because it considered a general police
power ordinance whose purpose was the same as the zoning ordinance-to control the
method of transmitting electricity. Notwithstanding the identity of purposes, the court
treated the two ordinances differently because the statute controlled only the zoning
ordinance. The police power ordinance required all electric power lines to be installed
underground if they carried more than 33,000 volts. The proposed lines had a 220,000
volt capacity and were to carry 132,000 volts. Thus the court was faced with the pre.
emption issue, i.e., whether the city has power to compel the "method" of transmitting
electricity generated by a state controlled utility. The court's approach in resolving the
issue against the city is reminiscent of that used when a zoning ordinance is involved
but there is no statute subjecting the utility to the zoning ordinance in that the court did
not weigh the competing considerations favoring municipal and state regulation.
The court reasoned that the need for uniform regulation should be given great weight.
Municipal boundaries are not barriers to the activities of public utilities; the utility in
this case supplied electricity to the most densely populated and highly industrialized areas
in the state. A utility could not properly perform its function if each municipality in
which it operated had the power to enact into law its own notions with respect to the
method of transmitting electricity. It was to assure uniform and adequate services that
the state created the utility commission, vesting in it plenary regulatory power over
utilities. Consequently, a municipality cannot control the method of transmitting
electricity without express power to do so. Not being able to find any express legislative
authorization for the ordinance, the court held it invalid.
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present needs, a second cable would soon need to be installed to meet fore-
casted demands; and there was no real danger of adverse effects on local
neighborhoods because the right-of-way stretched along a railroad track
which had already detracted from the appearance of the surrounding area.
There was also evidence that the utility planned to use safety precautions
and that injuries had never resulted from fallen lines.
Finally, all competing considerations and interests must be weighed before
making a determination of reasonable necessity. If they are equally bal-
anced the utility may be exempted from the operation of the zoning ordi-
nance because the broad interest of the public in having an adequate supply
of electricity outweighs the local interests of the zoning municipality.
On the basis of the evidence in this case the court held it could not find the
commission's decision unreasonable or capricious and affirmed the utility's
immunity from the zoning ordinance. This case underlines an important
consideration in any process of balancing state and local interests. Detri-
mental neighborhood effects will support the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance. But the ordinance must nevertheless give way when superior
statewide considerations intervene unless the balance of detriment is clearly
in the muncipality's favor.
III. OUTCOME INFLUENCED BY PREFERENCE FOR GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL
A. The Conventional Approach
If the applicable statute neither grants special powers to municipalities
nor defers to the local ordinances, the validity of the local ordinance de-
pends on judicial interpretation of legislative intent as the most frequently
used criterion to determine whether the state has preempted local authority.
In the liquor license area the applicable statutes are the liquor control
and zoning enabling acts. Although the liquor commission and the muni-
cipality are both creatures of the state, the courts classify the commission
as a "state agency" and impute to it some degree of state sovereignty; a
municipality is regarded as occupying a lower position in the governmental
hierarchy. Therefore, when the preemption question arises, judicial pref-
erence is given to the decision of the licensing agency unless its authority is,
by the licensing statute, made subject to the municipality's zoning regula-
tion. Preemption will result if the only basis of the ordinance is the general
30. Under the United States Constitution municipal corporations are regarded as
political subdivisions of the state which lack vested rights or powers which they may
asert against the state. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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zoning power conferred on the municipality by the zoning enabling act."
The reason advanced is that to hold otherwise would render meaningless
the power of the liquor commission to decide the location of state licensees
and a municipality could effect "a sort of left-handed Prohibition created
by a process of exclusion by ordinance,-a result not intended by the Liquor
Control Act."32
There are additional factors that influence a court to prefer the deter-
minations of both the liquor and utility commissions. One is that judicial
analysis is usually confined to the locational conflict between the local and
state agencies, even though the purposes of the state statute and the zoning
ordinance do not conflict. Another factor is judicial reluctance to question
either an administrative or a legislative determination. Therefore a court
will neither ascertain the basis of each regulation nor determine which
policy should prevail.
An additional basis for finding state preemption is for the court to take
an expansive view of the state statute. For example, a court will look to
the language of the liquor act and determine the functions performed by
the licensing agency. If they cover the purposes of the zoning ordinance,
the ordinance will be preempted on the ground that the decision of the
agency higher in the governmental hierarchy must prevail. For instance,
if authority is granted to the state licensing agency to prescribe the location
of state licensees,33 or to consider, before issuing a license, the local condi-
tions of the municipality where the applicant intends to locate3" there will
usually be a finding of state preemption. A similar result will follow when
31. Square Deal Coal Haulers & Yardmen's Club, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 86
Ohio L. Abs. 83, 176 N.E.2d 348 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1961); Salt Lake County v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 235, 357 P.2d 488 (1960).
32. Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Comm'n, supra note 31.
33. Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 241.060(2) (1955) provides that the state liquor Control
board shall "limit in its sound discretion the number of licenses.., to be issued in this
state or any political subdivision, and restrict the locations of licensed premises." Section
241.075(1) and (2) provides that the state board shall divide first class cities into two
different areas for the purpose of locating off-sale and on-sale premises. See Curl v.
Bartholomew, 321 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1959). In the absence of a showing that the state's
police power is being abused or exercised unreasonably, a zoning ordinance will not be
permitted to Contravene such broad authority. Marino v. City of Baton Rouge, 61 So. 2d
588 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
34. Staley v. City of Winston-Salem, 258 N.C. 244, 128 S.E.2d 604 (1962). An
additional factor here was an "intent," based upon years of failure in regulating the sale
of intoxicants, to prescribe uniform regulation throughout the state.
35. The basis of these decisions is that preemption is implicit in the city-state power
structure.
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the liquor act provides for a hearing of local objections prior to the issuance
of the state license."6
The rationale of the liquor license cases is also applied in the utility field
when the zoning and utility statutes are silent concerning the effect of zoning
ordinances on public utilities. Hence in determining whether the decision
of the utility commission has a preemptive effect on municipal zoning
ordinances, the majority of courts considering the applicability issue have
yielded to the decision of the utility commission on the basis of "legislative
intent." The factors held to indicate this intent are the broad regulatory
power of the utility commission, the public need for the facilities, the
statutory duty of the utility to provide adequate services, and the desirability
of uniform regulation when the utility's operations transcend municipal
36. E.g., Arxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-201B, C (Supp. 1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
243.360(1) (1955). The fact that a liquor act is comprehensive will not necessarily
result in state preemption. But when this quality is coupled with statutory language
empowering the commission to authorize the licensee to operate his business at the loca-
tion indicated in his license application (OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.27 (Page 1954),
applied in Spisak v. Village of Solon, 68 Ohio App. 290, 39 N.E.2d 531 (1941)), or
language providing that the commission's decision is binding unless the municipality has
exercised the local option privilege (OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.32 (Page 1954);
Spisak v. Village of Solon, supra; Hilovsky v. Hilovsky, 379 Pa. 118, 108 A.2d 705
(1954)), an ordinance attempting to regulate the location of a state licensee will be
preempted by state law. Although Spistak involved a home-rule municipality, the problem
of state preemption is just as acute as in non-home rule states since there is a tendency to
classify liquor control as a matter of state concern with which local ordinances may not
conflict. 1 MANDELKER, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 101.
Moreover, when the state licensee operates a restaurant, hotel or similar business
within which the liquor act expressly permits the sale of alcoholic beverages, the munic-
ipality may not prohibit the sale of such beverages through an ordinance which permits
the establishment of such a business within the zone but excludes any sale of liquor on
the premises. Staley v. City of Winston-Salem, 258 N.C. 244, 128 S.E.2d 604 (1962)
(restaurant); Hilovsky v. Hilovsky, supra (restaurant); Appeal of Sawdey, 369 Pa. 19,
85 A.2d 28 (1951) (hotel).
There are statutes whose language renders state preemption more probable. For
example, the liquor act may provide that the state licensing agency may refuse to issue
any license if not demanded "by public interest or convenience," or, if the community is
already saturated with a suicient number of liquor outlets. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 453
(10) (1953). The character of the locality is an important consideration but the cases
are not clear whether the state licensing agency includes zoning ordinances in its con-
sideration and, if it does, whether they are controlling. Lyons v. Delaware Liquor
Comm'n, 44 Del. 304, 54 A.2d 889 (1948). The state agency may allow fewer retail
liquor licenses in a residential area than in a business or shopping area of the same
size. Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Comm'n, supra. When one considers these provisions in
the light of the constant drift of regulatory powers to the state level, it is not unreasonable
to conclude that a court will find a legislative intent to confine the locating power in the
state agency to the exclusion of local ordinances.
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borders."7 Consequently, a municipality in these jurisdictions may not regu-
late the location 8 of utility facilities or the means by which the utility
provides its services unless it has received an express grant of power either
in the public utilities act or in the zoning enabling act;4" the general power
to enact zoning ordinances does not satisfy this requirement. 1 The fact that
37. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.
2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (depreciation of property value secondary to public welfare);
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Village of Old Brookville, 72 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct.),
afl'd, 273 App. Div. 856, 77 N.Y.S.2d 143, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 569, 81 N.E.2d 104 (1948);
Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
38. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, supra note 37; Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Village of Old Brookville, supra note 37; Duquesne Light Co. v.
Upper St. Clair Township, supra note 37; Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. White, 281 S.W.2d
441 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1955); see West Tex. Util. Co. v. City of Baird, 286 S.W.2d
185 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956). Contra, City of Richmond v. Southern Ry., 203 Va.
220, 123 S.E.2d 641 (1962) (no jurisdiction in utility commission to decide applica-
bility issue).
39. In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d 233 (1961); Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Village of Old Brookville, 84 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Following the affirmance of Long Island Lighting Co. v. Village of Old Brookville, supra
note 37, the village passed a general police power ordinance prohibiting the construction
above ground of electric transmission lines and requiring underground conduits instead.
In holding the ordinance invalid as beyond the legislative power of the village, the court,
relying on the statutory powers of regulation and supervision vested in the public service
commission, concluded that the municipality could not prohibit such construction on
private lands and in a predominantly rural area. Since the village was willing to permit
the utility to use its land regardless of the surrounding development as long as under-
ground conduits were used, it is clear that the ordinance was enacted solely to regulate
the means used by the utility to provide its services. Thus, it is apparent that in the first
Long Island Lighting case the purpose of the village in seeking to apply its zoning
ordinance was to control the means of transmitting electricity rather than the location of
transmission facilities. Such an application of a zoning ordinance has been judicially
condemned. In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., supra (dictum).
40. See State ex rel. Kearms v. Ohio Power Co., 163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E.2d 394
(1955).
41. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144
N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377
Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
Deciding whether a state has preempted an area depends on the meaning given the
appropriate statutory language. When the statute does not specifically defer to municipal
ordinances the courts are left to decide whether a local ordinance is applicable to utility
facilities. Judging from the cases in which courts have decided the preemption issue in
favor of the state on the basis of relatively inconclusive statutory language, a court most
likely would not subject a utility to a local ordinance if it had to decide the applicability
issue relying on statutory language like the following. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-301
(1947) provides that all state-created electric power companies may construct their
electrical lines over public and private lands, municipal permission being required only
for use of the streets. Because of the express permission to erect facilities on private land
and the clear exclusion of any local power over the use of private land, it is not unreason-
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these courts have held the general zoning power insufficient grounds on
which to resolve the applicability issue in favor of the municipality makes
clear that the outcome in these cases is influenced by a preference for the
decision of the utility commission.
B. Inadequacies of the Conventional Approach
Despite judicial inertia, the conventional approach to the preemption
problem must be abandoned because of its many inadequacies. For ex-
ample, in the utility area, judicial adherence to the conventional approach,
has neglected some important considerations for deciding the location con-
flict. In two cases, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor,2
and Long Island Lighting Co. v. Village of Old Brookville, 3 the utility de-
sired to erect electric transmission lines through a district zoned residential
in which they had previously acquired a right-of-way over private land.
In both cases, the ordinance was held to be preempted. The village in
Long Island Lighting contended that the towers and lines were commercial
structures prohibited in residential districts by the zoning ordinance. A
similar ordinance in Consolidated Edison, however, had the effect of ban-
ning the proposed line from the entire village since only a small portion of
it was zoned commercial. This distinction, although not discussed in the
two cases, would seem to be relevant to the preemption question. If it is
conceded that zoning protects a legitimate interest of a municipality, an
ordinance that prohibits a structure in one but not in another district of
the municipality should be given greater recognition than one that pro-
hibits or has the effect of prohibiting a particular use in the entire muni-
cipality," unless the size and character of the municipality affects the na-
ture of the zoning districts.
Furthermore, while in Consolidated Edison the court would not consider
whether the towers and lines could be more economically and suitably lo-
cated at an alternative site, in Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair
Township,"5 efficiency and economy were determinative of the decision and
this factor was given considerable weight by the court in holding the zoning
ordinance inapplicable. If public convenience and necessity dictate a find-
able to conclude that a court would find a "legislative intent" to preempt the field.
CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 762 provides that if the utility commission "orders the erection
of a new structure, it may also fix the site thereof." (Emphasis added.)
42. 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
43. 72 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 856, 77 N.Y.S.2d 143, aff'd,
298 N.Y. 569, 81 N.E.2d 104 (1948).
44 In holding that both municipalities exceeded their power in attempting to subject a
utility to a zoning ordinance, New York denies the distinction.
45. 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
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ing of non-applicability, the same considerations should support applica-
bility if the utility might be more suitably located, either within or without
the zoning municipality, since the increased cost resulting from unsuitable
location will be borne by the public in the form of higher rates.
In the liquor license cases too, if the purpose or effect of the zoning
ordinance is to exclude the licensee from the municipality, the ordinance
may be held invalid. For example, since the zoning enabling act confers
power on municipalities to "regulate" lawful uses of land, several courts
have held invalid per se a zoning ordinance that excludes a state licensee
from the entire municipality on the ground that this is not a "regulation"
but a "prohibition."4  Other courts, however, have not held such an
ordinance invalid per se, and have considered the conditions within the mu-
nicipality before applying the test." And other courts have taken the ap-
proach that an exclusionary ordinance is not invalid if the proposed use is in-
compatible with present or expected development within the community.48
The preemption issue should not be decided in favor of the state merely
because the ordinance excludes the use from the municipality. To do so
fails to give due consideration to the integrity of the zoning ordinance when
the exclusion of the licensee is necessary for the protection of land uses
within the municipality. As a result, a zoning ordinance may be invalidated
whenever it affects the location of a state licensee. Carried to its logical
conclusion, this analysis may allow a liquor outlet to be located within any
residential district regardless of its effect on the community. This approach
confuses the function of zoning with the control of liquor sales by identi-
fying zoning regulations with liquor legislation, conflicts with the idea
that the municipality is more aware of the community's needs than any
other governmental uni 9 and assumes the impossibility of harmonizing
the purposes of the liquor and zoning laws. In fact, these laws represent
two methods, mutually complementary, of promoting the general welfare.
The fact that zoning may cover some aspect of the regulation of alcoholic
beverage does not mean that it is a form of liquor control; its sweep and
46. E.g., Commonwealth v. Amos, 30 Del. Co. 522 (Pa. 1941).
47. Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); East
Fairfield Coal Co. v. Miller, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 490 (Mahoning County C.P. 1955).
48. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962); Carlton v.
Riddell, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 254, 132 N.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 1955).
49. One of the primary purposes of use zoning is the conservation of property values.
Business and structures, such a liquor stores, taverns and high-tension wires might, by
their inappropriate location, reduce surrounding property values as well as endanger the
health, safety and comfort of local residents.
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design are wide and its limited application in regulating the location of a
liquor outlet does not correspondingly limit its scope or purpose."0
The conventional approach gives rise to an additional problem in liti-
gating preemption issues. Whether the legislature "intended" the liquor and
public utility commissions to occupy the entire fields of liquor and utility
regulation cannot be precisely determined because published legislative his-
tories are rare. Consequently, the legislative intent must be culled from
statutory language, and often the mere fact that the liquor and utility com-
missions are given comprehensive regulatory powers is held determinative
of a legislative intent to "occupy the field." This approach fails to recog-
nize that the zoning statute also is comprehensive. Moreover, one may ques-
tion the conclusion that the liquor and utility commissions are state agen-
cies and hence the zoning ordinance, enforced by a local agency, should be
relegated to an inferior position. The municipality, the licensing agency
and the utility commission are all state agencies charged with the duty of
performing certain public functions. Since all these agencies derive their
power from the legislature, it is not untenable to argue that none has a
claim to a position of pre-eminence."' Of course, it is hornbook law that
state regulation by a superior governmental entity always preempts if the
local ordinance conflicts with it. Assuming this to be correct, preferring
the decision of the higher governmental level makes sense only when there
is a real conflict in purpose between the state and municipal regulations.
Moreover, the occupation of the field doctrine may serve as a cloak for
invalidating municipal regulations with which a court finds itself unsympa-
thetic." For example, one court held a zoning ordinance preempted by the
licensing act primarily on the ground that prior to the creation of the liquor
control board the state had witnessed years of failure in properly regulating
the manufacture and sale of intoxicants and hence the legislature must
have "intended" the licensing act to "occupy the field." Thus the court
used the occupation of the field doctrine to support a decision which it be-
lieved necessary because of a need for uniform regulation.5"
50. One court stated in rejecting the preemption argument:
Of course, ordinances which impose general regulations of the liquor traffic through
licenses, taxes or other such mechanisms of control must succumb to the exclusive
power of the department as to that subject matter. [Citations omitted.] The
[zoning] . . . ordinance, however, seeks only to restrict the sale or consumption of
liquor ... within 200 feet of residences. Instead of eliminating the use of alcoholic
beverages . . . the ordinance permits the sale of liquors ... elsewhere in the city.
The ordinance is a geographic restriction as to the place of sale and use of liquor,
not an invasion of the state's general regulation and limitation of the consumption
of liquors as such. Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 190 Cal. App. 2d 599, 606-07, 12
Cal. Rptr. 182, 186 (1961).
51. See Note, MfNN. L. Rlv. 284, 288-89 (1964).
52. 1 ANTI.AU, op. cit. supra note 8, at 291.
53. Antieau has also noted that the doctrine, generally speaking, is of no help to the
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IV. OUTCOME INFLUENCED BY CONSIDERATION OF THE UNDERLYING
POLICIES AND COMPETING INTERESTS
Close analysis has not been a trademark of the cases deciding preemption
issues in the license and utility areas. If the licensing agency, utility com-
mision or municipality has not been expressly given the exclusive power to
prescribe the location of liquor outlets and utility facilities, the correct
method of analysis is one in which the court first looks to the basis on which
each type of regulation is predicated to determine whether their purposes
are in conflict and then, if the purposes do not conflict, decides whether
the considerations favoring uniform, central control outweigh those favoring
the application of the local regulation. This balancing approach necessi-
tates delineation of the criteria utilized in each determination. To determine
these criteria one must first question what the state purports to regulate,
and then what the municipality purports to regulate.
A. Liquor Licensees
What are the principal factors the state considers when it grants a liquor
license? The character of the licensee and his proposed location are primary
considerations. However, since the purpose of the liquor act is to control in-
directly undesirable social behavior by regulating and restraining the traffic
in and consumption of intoxicating beverages, location is considered in the
licensing decision primarily as an element in restricting the number of li-
censees.
When the factors in the municipal decision are listed, it can be seen that
there are zoning considerations which are not taken into account at the
state level. Since the traditional purpose of the zoning ordinance is to struc-
ture the community along rational lines by regulating the location, char-
acter and purpose of lands and buildings within the municipality, the most
important zoning consideration is compatibility of land use. Thus, although
locational factors enter into both the licensing and zoning decisions, they
do so for different reasons-i.e., the opposing state and local decisions are
not predicated on the same criteria. Consequently, there is no conflict for
preemption purposes, so the balancing process should be invoked to resolve
the issue whether a decision on compatibility at the local level should pre-
vail over the state decision to license.
While land uses which are detrimental to adjacent property can con-
stitutionally be regulated under the zoning ordinance, the granting of a
state license alters the usual situation and provides the state licensee with
practicing attorney because it is impossible to determine beforehand what is the "field"
and whether it has been "occupied." Ibid.
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some protection from municipal interference. The court must determine
whether the marginal benefit to the municipality of increased compatibility
in land use is worth the marginal cost to the licensee of foregoing business
operations at the location in question. The marginal gain to the munici-
pality will depend on the character of the neighborhood and how well
the proposed use fits the desirable physical form and character of the com-
munity. If the neighboring properties are residential, the proposed use will
produce harmful effects on neighboring properties in the form of a capital
loss." Aside from the monetary considerations there are specific problems
the solution to which will also increase the marginal gain to the community.
For example, preclusion of the noncompatible land use (liquor outlet) will
decrease noise and danger to pedestrians. Moreover, exclusion of the
licensee who intends to locate near a school, church, hospital or play-
ground" will have a beneficial effect on the community.
To be balanced against the marginal benefit to the community is the
marginal expense to the licensee of complying with the ordinance. The
weight to be given the marginal cost factor will depend on whether the
local regulation has a limiting or an exclusory effect. The ordinance will
have a limiting effect when the licensee can secure another license even
though he cannot conduct his business at the location in question. Thus
the effect of the local regulation may often be capable of being quantified
by determining the cost to the licensee of complying with the ordinance
and operating his business at another location. The ordinance will have
an exclusory effect when the licensee cannot secure another license because
54. See RiCHENBACH, SOME ECONOMIC RECONSIDERATIONS OF ZONING-REMEDAL,
EMERGENT, AND UTOPIAN 113 (1963).
55. A number of states have enacted statutes that prohibit the sale of alcoholic
beverages within specified distances from churches, schools and hospitals. E.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 58-1029 (Supp. 1963): "No [state licensed] business . . . shall be operated
within 100 yards of any church, and 200 yards of a school ground or college campus."
Often a municipality will enact an ordinance which extends the no-sales limit beyond the
statutory boundaries. Again, the question of state preemption arises. Greater stringency
imposed by local regulation than that of the state is not in itself sufficient to invoke in-
validity because of conflict. If the statute does not expressly permit a state licensee to
operate his business beyond the prescribed distance, an ordinance which reasonably ex-
tends this distance is not prohibiting that which the statute permits and hence is not in
conflict with state law. State ex rel. Collins v. Kiernam, 240 Mo. App. 403, 207 S.W.2d
49 (1947) ("supplemental" ordinance); see Miller v. Fabius Township Bd., 366 Mich.
250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962) ("supplemental" ordinance). This approach-resolving
the applicability issue by determining whether the ordinance prohibits that which the
statute permits, or vice versa-is unsatisfactory too because it relegates the municipality
(a state agency) to a lower position in the governmental hierarchy than the liquor
commission and fails to recognize not only that the zoning enabling legislation is as
comprehensive as the liquor control act, but that the decisions of the state and local
agencies are based on different criteria.
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an alternative available location is unsatisfactory to the state licensing
agency. Of course, another factor to consider is the extent to which the
license applicant is willing to be mobile. Nevertheless, the ordinance will
limit the licensee's freedom of location and this factor must be considered
in the balancing process.
The second consideration in the balancing process should involve the
propriety of the state decision that competition at the proposed location
will not produce undesirable effects on the municipality. The correctness
of the state agency's determination must first be reviewed. If the demand
in the community for the services of the state licensed business is satisfied
by existing facilities, or the proposed location is too close to that of a com-
petitor, then the state agency's decision on this point should be overturned."
If the state agency's decision is affirmed, its impact on the zoning deter-
mination should then be considered.
However, if one of the bases of the zoning ordinance is consideration of
the competitive factor, then this consideration in the balancing process
should be decided in favor of the state on the basis of preemption since
the same criterion-the competitive factor-has entered into both the state
and local decisions."
56. A statement made in 1908 is equally appropriate today:
Experience in municipal affairs has demonstrated that increasing the number of
saloons in a municipality beyond the reasonable wants of the people tends greatly
to increase lawlessness, and makes the administration of law and the preservation of
order more difficult.... When the number [of liquor outlets] is increased beyond
that required to satisfy the normal demand, the saloon keepers are compelled, in
order to make the business profitable, to resort to all manner of vices to create
an artificial demand for liquor and an increase in the consumption of liquor beyond
the normal. The evil consequences flowing from these practices, and the increased
difficulty in the preservation of peace and order, and the enforcement of law
caused by such a situation can be readily seen.... In re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. 836,
116 N.W. 966 (1908).
57. Several courts have held consideration of the competitive factor in zoning to be
unconstitutional or ultra vires. MANDELKER, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose
in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIG. 33, 34-39 (1962). Many zoning ordinances, however, have
been upheld although a byproduct of their application was the limitation of competition
through a restriction of the area in which a business could be conducted. E.g., Appeal of
Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955). Although courts have struck down
zoning ordinances which attempt to directly control the number of liquor outlets accord-
ing to population, State ex rel. Haverback v. Thomson, 134 Conn. 288, 57 A.2d 259
(1948), zoning ordinances have been upheld which indirectly control the number of
such outlets by prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages within specified distances from
other liquor outlets. State ex tel. Wise v. Turkington, 135 Conn. 276, 63 A.2d 596
(1948); Ragozzino v. Town of Lake Maitland, 54 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1951) (750 feet);
Ohaikin v. City of Miami, 158 Fla. 742, 30 So. 2d 101 (1947) (2500 feet). Since the
trend in zoning is away from its historic function due to the increasing scarcity of land
for certain business uses in metropolitan areas, perhaps the zoning commission should
be permitted to consider the proximity and demand factors and accomplish directly what
they have been sustained in accomplishing indirectly.
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B. Public Utilities
At the outset a brief discussion of the evolution of the public utility com-
mission is relevant. It will serve the dual purpose of differentiating the pur-
poses of the zoning and utility regulations, and defining the criteria to be
used in balancing the state and local decisions.
With the expansion of urban communities, the domestic, commercial and
industrial need for public utility services-gas, water, electricity and trans-
portation-increases. Public utility companies (also referred to as public
service corporations) were organized to provide these services.58 These
utilities operated on a statewide basis and hence the cities, by themselves,
were incapable of uniformly supervising utility operations which spanned
city lines. This caused utilities to be subjected to confusing and conflicting
regulations. Moreover, since these companies were monopolistic in form 9
and grew as quickly as the cities which they serviced, there was always the
danger that the public would suffer from unreasonable service and exces-
sive rates. Consequently, state public utility commissions were created,
assuring the public of reasonable rates and adequate service, the utilities of
uniform regulation.
Although the purposes of the zoning and utility regulations do not con-
flict, state-controlled utilities do serve more than one municipality. Should
the argument be made that uniform regulation requires that state utility
regulation entirely preempts local zoning even though the state utility act
is silent? The following discussion shows that strong arguments can be
made both for6" and against6 state preemption per se.
Since utility operations transcend municipal boundaries because of the
needs of customers in distant areas, both the consuming public and the util-
ity have an interest in seeing that alterations and improvements in facilities
are not impeded. Thus, when new utility facilities are needed to provide
for the public demand, municipal regulations arguably should not be per-
mitted to determine the type, method and location of construction when
the effect of such regulations would either prevent or increase the cost of
58. A public utility has a duty to render adequate service to its customers. See United
States Fuel Gas. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929). This duty has
been incorporated in state utility statutes. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 32
(Smith-Hurd 1954): "[E]very public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such
service instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as shall promote the safety, health,
comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees, and public and as shall be in all re-
spects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable." For a discussion of the scope of a public
utility's duty to render adequate service, see Note, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962).
59. Competition in these industries is not feasible. See Note, 62 COLUM. L. Rav. 312
(1962).
60. Avery, Zoning and Public Utilities, 55 PuB. UTU,. FORT. 252 (1955).
61. Haller, Zoning and the Utilities, 56 PuB. UTa. FORT. 231 (1955).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
furnishing adequate services to customers not inhabitants of the regulating
municipality. On the other hand, the objectives of zoning regulations and
the municipal interest in stabilizing the use and value of their property also
deserve consideration.
Conceding that both the state and municipality have legitimate interests
to protect and that a less efficient or more costly location of a land use may,
in terms of net community benefit, be more advantageous to general wel-
fare than the most efficient and economical site, the preemption issue can
once more be decided by balancing marginal gain to the locality against
marginal loss to the utility. The comparative advantages and disadvantages
to the utility, municipality and consuming public of alternative locations
(both inside and outside the zoning municipality"2 ) and facilities must be
weighed. Important considerations are the various costs of different facili-
ties at different locations, the feasibility of the proposed and alternative lo-
cations, the effect of the facility on surrounding property values, the possi-
bility of hazards to persons and property and the effect on the utility's abil-
ity to satisfy present and future demands. Simply because the location or
facility approved by the municipality is less convenient or more expensive to
the utility should not lead to a decision favoring the utility, a trend that is
noticeable in some of the cases. The courts must face more directly the
effects of weighing one marginal advantage over another.
CONCLUSION
Preemption problems arise in the liquor license and public utility fields
because of the legislative failure to define clearly the areas of state and local
authority. Often a state regulatory statute is enacted without regard to an-
other statute conferring similar power on the municipality. Consequently,
if a state-local conflict arises the court must determine whether the state has
impliedly preempted and thus foreclosed the field from municipal regulation.
Often the test of preemption is defined in terms of "legislative intent." For
example, a court may find the state regulation so complete and detailed
that it demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt the entire field. The
use of such a vague, fictional test is unfortunate, however, because the
62. A zoning ordinance which completely prohibits a proposed use from the muni-
cipality should not be held invalid before considering extraterritorial factors. If land
for the proposed use is available in a neighboring municipality, the ordinance should not
be held invalid on the ground that it fails to satisfy an existing public need. Moreover,
a zoning ordinance to be valid must be enacted in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and it is utterly impossible for a municipality to enact a comprehensive zoning
plan if it must provide for every lawful use of land. For a discussion of those cases
which have considered extraterritorial factors in determining the validity of local zoning,
see Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsir. U.L.Q. 107.
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underlying competing considerations are either not articulated or not given
primary emphasis.
The failure of most state statutes to specify the areas of state and local
control, coupled with the constant expansion of regulatory power at the
state level, will make the resolution of state-local conflicts increasingly diffi-
cult. Moreover, the ever-increasing local interest in planning and zoning
will lead to more municipal regulation of state-licensed businesses and util-
ities. Therefore, the courts will necessarily need to take a closer look at the
basis of the state and local regulations to determine whether the local ordi-
nance would thwart the purpose of the state statute. The preemption ques-
tion should be decided only after the competing interests which support the
state and local decisions have been balanced. Giving the courts the bal-
ancing function will allow them to second guess both the state agency and
the municipality in the guise of deciding the "conflict." But there may be
no alternative. For example, if the utility commission is given jurisdiction to
decide the conflict, the local zoning ordinance may be given only slight con-
sideration. The issues are difficult and it is equally difficult to see how a
statute can resolve them without recourse to judicial intervention unless the
state grants exclusive regulatory power to the locality or the state agency.
The balancing approach is the most satisfactory in the absence of statu-
tory solutions to state-local conflicts. But the problems considered in this
note can best be eliminated by legislative delineation of the boundaries of
state and local control. For example, a regulatory statute could provide that
its provisions shall be applicable throughout the state and that a municipal-
ity shall not enact any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of the
statute unless expressly authorized. The statute could then authorize addi-
tional municipal regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions
of the statute, and list the areas within which the local authorities could
legislate. Statutes drawn in these terms would eliminate the unsatisfactory
doctrine of preemption by implication.
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